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Abstract It is argued here that business firms can and do
provide an incubator that enables the Aristotelian category
of friendships of advantage to develop into friendships of
virtue. This contradicts other literature that views
acquaintances of utility as the business norm, and expresses
pessimism concerning more advanced virtuous develop-
ment of friendship within the business firm. It is argued
here, however, that this virtuous development is integral to
the Kantian social aim of pursuing a moral community, an
aim which declares the appropriate moral motivation for
business, and that certainly should incorporate a role for
developing virtuous relations as a component of that pur-
suit. An atmosphere that encourages the development of
relations of virtue is feasible, exists in real business, and is
optimal for pursuit of moral business communities.
Keywords Kantian moral motivation  Pursuit of moral
community in business  Aristotelian friendships of virtue
Introduction
The three-part title of this article suggests interactions
between a category of social relations, moral motivation,
and the ends of business organizations. It is a trite obser-
vation that modern society is built around the social insti-
tutions of family, church, civic, and business organizations,
with the latter certainly not being the least in either amount
or importance of activity. This places business in a
significant role for facilitating friendly social interactions,
for which Sommers (1997), Koehn (1998), and Cooley
(2002) suggest that only friendships of advantage (or
utility) are likely to result. Below, I argue against this view
of business-related friendships. I argue that friendships of
virtue are facilitated by business; that they can be, and
likely are important for facilitating the pursuit of a moral
business community. An outline of my argument is pre-
sented immediately below. The body of this article sup-
ports each of these three points in greater detail.
• Business firms are communal activities. The proper
moral motivation for business is to pursue a moral
community as in Kant’s third formula for the categor-
ical imperative. If followed, this motivation focuses the
business person’s attention away from the personal
consequences of potential immoral acts, and towards a
commitment to the business community at hand and the
consequences for it. For this community focus, the
moral motivation is likely to be more effective,
certainly for those who have sympathy for the potential
suffering of business colleagues and constituents,
suffering that might result from the moral failings of
others.1 Actual full achievement of the moral commu-
nity, rather than the pursuit, cannot be the point because
the knowledge that this achievement is unlikely could
lead to discouragement, and therefore abandonment of
the motive. It is the pursuit of the Kingdom of Ends (in
Kantian terminology) that is important here. This
previously unexplored view of the appropriate
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motivation for business is offered as the first of three
contributions provided by this article.
• Friendships are part of any community including that of
business. The intense working and lasting relationships
found within business potentially facilitate the devel-
opment of friendships of utility, but also friendships of
virtue in the Aristotelian sense. The former category of
friendship may develop into the latter among those
motivated to pursue a moral community as referred to
above. Such friendships reinforce the morality of one
another, and also promote a wider set of, and commit-
ment to, positive duty, and can become essential parts
of any business community. In addition, business
people with friendships of virtue are likely to be
reluctant to alienate those relations through their own
potential moral lapses. Previous explorations of busi-
ness friendships left those of the virtue category barely
explored. The elucidation presented here is therefore
the second contribution of this article.
• Because of the above, the moral motivation of the
pursuit of the moral community within business,
together with developed friendships of virtue, are likely
to interact so as to strengthen the morality of business.
In effect, the development of friendships of virtue
potentially and partially operationalize the pursuit of
the moral community for business.2 This conclusion
represents the third contribution of this article.
To explore these interrelated issues in depth, the article
first addresses the issue of moral motivation, both in a
general social sense and in the specific sense applicable to
business. For this, as indicated above, the ‘‘Moral Moti-
vation’’ section reviews a Kantian approach, but from a
somewhat different perspective than previously addressed
by the literature. Following this, in the ‘‘Classic and Recent
Applicable Notions of Friendship, Sociability, and Moral
Community’’ section the article examines the role of
friendships in business; ‘‘The Pursuit of Business as a
Moral Community, Friendships of Virtue, and Duty’’ sec-
tion examines the role that relations of virtue play in
enhancing the scope and commitment to positive duty in
business; the ‘‘Relations of Virtue and Avoidance of Evil
in Business’’ section examines the role of these relations in
avoidance of evil in business. The last section summarizes
the roles that development of virtuous relations can play in
operationalizing the pursuit of a moral business
community.
Moral Motivation
Immanuel Kant argued that the moral law should be
respected and followed because it is self-imposed. (See the
Kant 1785, ‘‘First Section,’’ and also Hill 1992, p. 6, Kors-
gaard 1996, pp. 22–23, and Wood 1999, p. 32.) This argu-
ment, however, appears less than complete, and rather
inadequate as a motivation for morality. Why should
someone self-impose moral duty, and why should it be
respected? It is argued below that the answers to these
questions have profound consequences for the conceptual-
ization of business ethics.
These answers also properly pertain to the broader ques-
tion of the potential morality and benefits of a competitive-
market economy. This ‘‘broader question’’ is manifested by
the apparent contradiction between Adam Smith’s ethical
philosophy as expressed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(1759), and the egoistic agent of the invisible-hand as
expressed in Wealth of Nations (1776). (See White 2011,
pp. 114–115.) White (2010) argues that Smith did not favor
egoism. Since agents know their self-interests, Smith pointed
out that markets can operate with a degree of efficiency, but
Smith did not argue that they should operate that way. The
moral behavior of business participants still determines the
extent that market interactions fulfill societal interests. It is
argued here that the moral motivation of pursuit of a moral
business community determines this behavior.
Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory was published within a
twenty-one-year span after Smith’s Wealth of Nations. This
ethical theory is founded on Kant’s categorical imperative
process (CI process) with its three formulae. (See below and
also see Sullivan 1994.) In Kantian analysis, it is essential to
recognize that this CI process is both a method of forming
personal maxims, and after social discourse, of forming
political commitments to these maxims. The three formulae
are, as Kant argued, interrelated where one logically follows
from the other. They are usually viewed as logical restate-
ments of each other. It is argued below, however, that they
are more unique than mere ‘‘restatements.’’ Each formula
plays a particular role in the CI process. They may logically
follow from one another, but they still express differing
principles necessary for the process to function.
To this end, it is argued below that the third formula of
the CI properly specifies ethical motivation: Act so as to
pursue the Kingdom of Ends of a moral community (K of
E). This point concerning ethical motivation has not been
previously emphasized, but only indirectly alluded to, and
therefore not clearly presented in previous literature.3 This,
2 Adoption and communication of moral maxims, including appro-
priate adjustments to evaluation and reward systems being the
additional operationalizing parts.
3 One assumes that since Kant emphasized ‘‘respect for the moral
law’’ as the motivation, Kantians avoided turning to the third formula




and only this, socially and personally justifies a rational
respect for the moral law; the other nonsocial reasons being
egoistic, that is either religious (other-worldly as in the
pursuit of a heavenly reward), or the pursuit of virtue for
the purpose of achieving personal contentment. In fact, the
third formula is the reason for the moral law’s existence.
Pursuit of the K of E is the logical-political reason we self-
impose our moral maxims, i.e., we pursue a moral com-
munity in both general society, and in the context of our
particular business and economic relations. Indeed, this
motivation is communal in that it is a moral commitment to
all the communities one belongs to.4 Business is one of the
most important (next to family and friends) of these com-
munities, or at the very least it is extraordinarily ubiqui-
tous. This non-egoistic motivation should therefore be
emphasized in explorations of business ethics.
What is meant by Kant’s claim that the moral motivation
should be respect for the moral law?Why should respect be
the paramount argument? The reason offered is that through
the categorical imperative process, the moral law is self
legislated. The implication is that once the moral law is
logically imposed, a violation would be against the agent’s
own logic, i.e., illogical, but why impose this moral law on
one’s actions to begin with? The possible reasons are con-
sequentialist, either personal or social consequentialist.
The first non-religious motive for this respect is egoistic
as presented in the Socratic dialogue Gorgias: moral vio-
lations cause disharmony with oneself (with one’s con-
science), hence they are self destructive. (See Arendt 1978,
p. 181.) The second non-religious reason is that moral
violations attack the community.
‘‘As citizens, we must prevent wrong-doing because
the world in which we all live, wrong-doer, wrong-
sufferer, and spectator, is at stake; the city (commu-
nity) has been wronged.’’ (Ibid, p. 182, parentheses
added.)
It is the second consequentialist reason that is expressed
by pursuit of the moral community in business, i.e., an
application of Kant’s third formula of the categorical
imperative.
Bowie particularly argued the applicability of the third
formula for business.
‘‘Loosely put, this formulation of the categorical
imperative says that you should act as if you were a
member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which you
were both subject and sovereign at the same
time. But what did Kant mean? Kant recognized that
human beings interacted with other human beings
(ends). Thus, the arena of interactions was called a
‘‘kingdom of ends.’’ A business organization, like any
other organization, is composed of individual persons
and since persons are moral creatures, the interactions
of persons in an organization are constrained by the
categorical imperative.’’ (Bowie 1999, pp. 87–89)
Although this K of E is an unreachable ideal, its pursuit
motivates notions of duty usually founded in Kant’s first
two formulae of the CI.5 This K of E goal should be
intended, of course, to conceptualize the pursuit of a wide
moral society, but it should also conceptualize a single
organization (a business organization) as a union with
harmonious pursuit of moral maxims with implied duties.
As reviewed below, the profit motive of classical eco-
nomics must be properly interpreted as subsumed within
the broader pursuit of a moral business community, and
this view is best founded on Kant’s CI process.6
Bowie (1999) does not explicitly argue that the third
formula should be considered the motivational formula, but
following Hill (1992), he argues that the third formula
provides a ‘‘heuristic model of the appropriate moral atti-
tude to take when deliberating from basic moral values to
moderately specific principles.’’ (Hill 1992, p. 244) The
‘‘appropriate moral attitude’’ is close to stating ‘‘motiva-
tion’’ for action. Bowie continues, however, to state that
these ‘‘moderately specific principles’’ provide the afore
mentioned ‘‘heuristic,’’ that in particular ‘‘… a firm should
be managed so both the organizational rules and the
organizational structures are neither coercive nor deceptive
and are supportive of meaningful work for employees. …
Finally, the organizational rules and structures must be fair
to all stakeholders.’’ (Bowie 1999, p. 89)
Bowie’s ‘‘heuristic’’ is not meant to be a statement of
moral motivation, but rather a design of moral codes that
guide a firm. It is argued below that Bowie’s vision of the
K of E is incomplete. This ‘‘pursuit’’ requires more than the
‘‘heuristic’’ mentioned above. It not only requires a moti-
vational view for forming and following a business’s
maxims, but as a central feature this view also benefits
from the formation and utilization of friendships of virtue.
The benefits of friendships within business have been
previously addressed by Sommers (1997), and Koehn
(1998), but not within the context of the utilization of
4 Wood (1999, pp. 301–302) makes the point that the opposite of an
egoistic motive is a ‘‘pluralistic’’ motive, the latter being ‘‘cos-
mopolitan,’’ i.e., ‘‘citizen of the world.’’
5 Notions of duty can be derived from each of the formulae of the CI,
and according to Kant’s argument, each formula is implied by the
others. Note that Kant (1785, ‘‘Second Section’’) used the first
formula to derive an illustrative set of four maxims with implied
duties.
6 Brennan (2012) argues that for-profit business can be consistent
with the exercise of civic virtue. This is a non-Kantian approach.
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friendships of virtue for operationalizing the pursuit of the
K of E. The desirability of this utilization is emphasized
here.
This analysis begins with a review of classic notions of
moral community which lay the foundation for the Kantian
view. These notions include Aristotelian and Stoic ideas of
virtuous social interaction relevant for proper exploration
of such a community. It is one thing to be motivated to
pursue a moral community, it is another to form the nec-
essary maxims for this pursuit, and still another to opera-
tionalize this pursuit. The following section pertains to this
operationalization.
Classic and Recent Applicable Notions
of Friendship, Sociability, and Moral Community
Aristotelian virtue ethics is founded on individual pursuit
of ‘‘eudaimonia’’—literally ‘‘having a guardian spirit,’’ but
generally interpreted as having a flourishing life. Its usual
definition is ‘‘having an objectively desirable life, univer-
sally agreed by ancient philosophy to be the supreme
good.’’ (Taylor 1995, p. 252.) This is not the modern
philosophical concept of happiness as in a subjectively
satisfying life. The objectively desirable life, i.e., the pur-
suit of the good, is the aim of virtue ethics where Socratic-
Platonic and Stoic notions of virtue are posed as possibly
sufficient for this objective.7
Kant posed that our non-egoistic-consequentialist moral
maxims should be independent of our search for personal
wellbeing. Taylor points out, however, that a philosophy of
primacy for eudaimonia does not imply egoism (since
altruism may be a constituent of eudaimonia) or even
narrow consequentialism (since the virtuous moral life is
viewed as absolutely required for eudaimonia). (See Taylor
2000, p. 260.) Hence the supposed gulf between Kantian
and eudaimonist theories need not be real. I argue below
that properties of virtue ethics are necessary for the Kantian
pursuit of a moral community. How do we envision this
pursuit? Virtue ethics, I argue, plays an important role in
this pursuit.
Friendships of Virtue
Should Aristotle’s notion of friendships of virtue be con-
sidered a key component of the pursuit of a moral com-
munity within business? Cooley (2002) and Sommers
(1997) argue that the business community does not include
such friendships. Koehn (1998), however, argues some-
what differently, i.e., that such relations might develop in
business. These arguments are reviewed in this section
along with a more optimistic view of their existence and
possible necessity.
In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) (1976), busi-
ness relationships are categorized under ‘‘civic’’ relation-
ships, which are essential for human good (eudaimonia or
flourishing life). All of these civic relations are classified
under the rubric of friendships where there are three types
listed (NE: 1156 a 7–1157 b 1):
• Friendships based on pleasure seeking, such as those
involving recreation of various sorts,
• Friendships based on mutual advantage,
• Friendships based on recognition of moral goodness,
also termed ‘‘perfect friendships,’’ or ‘‘friendship of
virtue,’’ or ‘‘friendships of character.’’ (See Cooper
1980, Chap. 17, p. 304)
We typically consider the second classification,
‘‘friendships based on mutual advantage,’’ as applying to
business relations. (See Sommers 1997.) I suggest, how-
ever, that we should consider these Aristotelian categories
as overlapping, although possibly of unequal benefit
between the parties. In business, an ideal is to have
friendships based on ‘‘recognition of moral goodness’’
within management. These include friendships between
lower and upper management with the latter exhibiting
moral leadership, or among managers of similar levels of
responsibility with each encouraging and reinforcing the
moral character of the other.
As specified in NE, friendship involves wishing for the
good of the other party provided this is at least somewhat
reciprocated. (Ibid, p. 304) Friendships of moral virtue may
develop when two people, having spent time together to
know one another’s character, use this knowledge to
develop trust and love for one another because of their
good human qualities. (NE: 1156 b 25–29, and 1156 a 3–5,
and 1156 b 12–17) For our purposes, it is important to note
that friendships of advantage can be based on mutual
benefit which given time can also emerge into either of the
other classifications, or both. This is also an argument
presented in Koehn (1998).8 In particular, starting with a
quote from Aristotle, Koehn observes:
‘‘And virtue friendships begin in decency. The
friendship of decent people is decent, and increases
the more often they meet. And they seem to become
still better from their activities and their mutual
correction. For each molds the other in what they
approve of.’’ (NE, 1172a 10–14) If you treat me
7 Aristotle adds possible good fortune and external goods as
necessary additional factors. (Ibid, p. 252).
8 Koehn (1998) argues that friendships of virtue are rare in business,
but offers no argument or evidence in support. The author, however,




decently in negotiations, I am more likely to recip-
rocate and vice versa. We will both, as the saying
goes, ‘‘rise to the occasion’’ and make each other
better as a result. So friendships of utility (advantage)
play an important role in teaching basic social skills,
in building community and in preparing people for
more challenging friendships.’’ (Koehn 1998,
p. 1758)
Friendships of virtue rely on ‘‘love of the other for the
other’s sake’’ (NE, 9.viii), and may well develop within
business because of the intense and lasting cooperation and
interactions required. This argument is developed in this
section.
A relevant question for our problem at hand is, ‘‘What is
the value of having friends?’’ Aristotle’s answer is that the
flourishing life involves and requires friends, and also
requires service to them out of ‘‘unself-interested good-
will.’’ (NE 9.iv and 9.ix, and in Cooper 1980, Chapter 17,
p. 318) A man’s friend is to him a ‘‘second self’’ (NE: 1213
a 10–26) ‘‘to live with and share in discussion and thought
with—for this is what living together would seem to mean
for human beings, (as contrasted with merely) feeding in
the same place as with cattle.’’ (Parentheses added.) (NE:
1170 b 10–14) This ‘‘living with’’ can also be reinterpreted
as ‘‘working with’’ since management typically involves
intense, ongoing, and purposeful interaction of the sort that
can exceed the tenure and intensity of non-business rela-
tions. These morality reinforcing relationships of virtue
may be necessary for the pursuit of any semblance of a
moral community within the civic relation of business. If
these relationships are not absolutely necessary for the
pursuit of the moral community then surely they would
assist in such a pursuit. Any organization we could envi-
sion as pursuing a moral business community would likely
exhibit at least some of these friendships, probably would
exhibit widespread friendships, and would desire to
encourage the development of these virtuous relations
within it.
Business effectiveness and efficiency requires (a) en-
gaging those with sufficient background-level general
knowledge necessary for a reasonable expectation of
enabling the firm to prosper, (b) investing time and other
resources in those so engaged so that they develop the
specific knowledge required for the success of the business,
and (c) encouraging those engaged and invested into
maintain long-term relations with the firm so that the
business is successful.9 Friendships of virtue are more
valuable for the firm than friendships of advantage both
because of intrinsic reasons (explored immediately below),
and for the former category’s ability to encourage the long-
lasting relations that are beneficial to business success.
Aristotle’s idea of the development of friendships of
virtue is germane to our exploration. It is one of a dynamic
that reinforces and builds among moral friends.
‘‘For friendship is a kind of partnership, and a man
stands in the same relation to his friend as to himself,
and since the consciousness of his own existence is
desirable, the consciousness of his friend’s must be
the same. They seem to become better men by
exercising their friendship and improving each other;
for the traits that they admire in each other get
transferred to themselves. Hence ‘‘from good comes
goodness.’’ (NE, 9.xii.)
Another view of what Aristotle had in mind is that a
‘‘pleasant self awareness is only satisfactorily obtained through
the awareness of a friend and his activities.’’ (Cooper 1980,
p. 319) Stewart (1892) eloquently describes this relation:
‘‘He has a sympathetic consciousness of the actions
of his friend—of actions which are still in a sense
‘‘his own’’ … In other words, it is in the conscious-
ness of the existence of another that a man becomes
truly conscious of himself.’’ (p. 392)
This might all appear to describe pleasant and relaxed
relations between friendly philosophers, but it can also
apply to the intense and active relations of business.
Awareness of the moral actions of fellow managers helps to
place one’s personal actions in context for judgement, self
reflection, and refinement. The essence of Aristotle’s anal-
ysis is that ‘‘the self sufficing man will require friendship in
order to know oneself.’’ (Cooper 1980, p. 320) Here, the
notion of ‘‘self sufficiency’’ implies personal characteristics
once deeply ingrained and sort of permanently present, will
be exercised as a natural tendency. The development of this
‘‘self sufficiency’’ is the purpose of virtue ethics.10
How is this position of requiring friends of virtue in
order to know oneself justified? Aristotle’s argument
begins with notions of eudaimonia, i.e., ‘‘the flourishing
life consists essentially of morally and intellectually
excellent activities.’’ (Ibid, p. 329) ‘‘A human being cannot
have a flourishing life except by having intimate friends to
whom he is attached precisely on account of their good
qualities of character and who are similarly attached to
him: it is only with such persons that he can share the
moral activities that are most central to his life.’’ (Ibid,
9 Specific knowledge can only be transmitted from one agent to
another at high cost. It is relevant for allocation of decision rights and
responsibilities within the firm, and necessary for effective firm
functioning. See Jensen (2000, p. 143), and also Brickley et al.
Footnote 9 continued
(2007), for an extensive review of the roles of general and specific
knowledge for firm success.
10 Annas (1993), makes this point throughout her treatise.
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p. 330) This is the reason for the ‘‘second self’’ mentioned
above. This Aristotelian notion goes beyond the judge-
ment-development and refinement benefits of friendship. It
involves notions of enhancing contentment and joy as
supported and reinforced by the moral community of
similar friends of virtue. This certainly describes the ideal
of a moral business, i.e., a union of intimate friends one can
rely on because of their good qualities.
Cooper continues, however:
‘‘To know the goodness of one’s life, which he rea-
sonably assumes to be a necessary condition of
flourishing, one needs to have intimate friends whose
lives are similarly good, since one is better able to
reach a sound and secure estimate of the quality of
life when it is not one’s own. This involves wanting
the other to prosper, and to know the moral virtue of
another, one must know them carefully over time.’’
(Ibid, p. 330)
Full development of friendship, even within the business
community, requires knowing ‘‘the moral virtue of
another’’ as a reinforcement of one’s own moral virtue.
Only actual participants in friendships of virtue could
adequately testify about any dynamic interaction with
second selves that ultimately leads to virtuous growth. A
partial history of business friendships that might warrant
the friendship of virtue classification would need to rely on
biography for evidence. From these sources I offer the
following possible examples without elaboration:
• Wilbur and Orville Wright. (See McCullough 2015.)
• Kelly Johnson and Ben Rich of Lockheed’s Skunk
Works fame. (See Rich and Janos 1994.)
• Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen of the establishment
of the WWII Willow Run B-24 Liberator plant. (See
Baime 2014.)
• Andrew Carnegie and his mentor Thomas Scott. (See
Josephson 1962, and Wikipedia.)
• Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield of Ben and Jerry’s Ice
Cream. (See Lager 1994, and Wikipedia.)
• Bill Gates and Paul Allen of Microsoft and philan-
thropic efforts. (See Allen 2011, and Wikipedia.)
It is also important to note that besides the friendships
described above, moral communities contain some degree
of beneficent action among constituents. To pursue a moral
community means to pursue this beneficence among other
duties. Such pursuit can enhance the classical friendships
described by Aristotle whether for advantage or virtue, and
friendships are surely facilitated by these actions whether
because potential friends are cooperating in this benefi-
cence, or because one of the parties benefits from it, and so
is drawn into the relationship. The true pursuit of happiness
(eudaimonia) in the classical sense of Aristotle and the
Stoics, is to pursue such relationships of which more is
explored by Kant.11
Business interactions are typically viewed as between
only acquaintances which have a high degree of social
distance, but they are actually based on trust. Because of
this, as explored above, these acquaintances can develop
into friendships of advantage, and perhaps ultimately
friendships of virtue. The relevant question concerns
‘‘What factors can interrupt this development process?’’ An
answer is provided by Kant’s anthropological analysis of
human nature.
Unsocial Sociability and Friendships
Are friendships of virtue necessary to overcome what Kant
termed unsocial sociability? Kant assumes that all rational
action is teleological, i.e., it pursues some ends which
include communally coordinated action that pursues a
communal end as in the business firm. (See Wood 1999,
p. 162.) A firm is fundamentally a community among those
who we assume rationally and voluntarily accept a system
of maxims for allocating decision rights, responsibilities,
and compensation rewards for an economic purpose. For
example, these decision rights and responsibilities include
the systems for deciding which long-term capital expansion
projects to accept, which marketing strategies to adopt,
which employee development initiatives to undertake, and
other policy undertakings. By ‘‘rational acceptance’’ I
mean that the agents involved either participate in deciding
this allocation, or/and are convinced that this allocation
accords with their own reflective consent. An example
would be an employee who accepts her/his work-related
assignment. Otherwise we must assume that constituents
would not voluntarily play a role in this firm. The point is
made by Bowie (1999, pp. 88–89) that in the Kantian CI
process, the maxims of the firm must be publicly formed
and accepted by all engaged agents. This is basic Kantian
analysis in that it excludes deception and coercion.
Kant’s empirical anthropology analyzes humanity’s
unsocial sociability, i.e., our tendency to resist and ulti-
mately frustrate the efforts and intended ends of others.
(See Kant 1784, vol. 8, p. 21, and Wood 1999, p. 213, and
White 2011, p. 112.) This might occur among individuals
within the firm, as well as competition with externals. This
is a dark view of humanity’s nature, but Kant viewed this
natural unsocial tendency as also having positive attributes
of stimulating us to overcome our laziness by seeking
honor. It also has the negative aspect of seeking
11 The ancient philosophy, however, emphasized reflective revision
and growth in virtue over one’s life, a reflection and revision that
ultimately leads to a happiness of contentment. (See Annas 1993,
p. 332.) This requires, according to Aristotle, a ‘‘complete life with
complete virtue.’’ (NE, 1.x.).
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domination and property status over others whom we might
dislike, but still cannot leave alone due to our inherent
nature. We compete for positions, engage in rent seeking as
a result of those positions, and may engage in the
destruction of the creative efforts of others.12 The third
formula of the CI, i.e., pursuit of a moral community, is
aimed at redirecting our negative social passions (or
inclinations) for gaining power over others for the purpose
of using others as tools solely towards our own selfish ends,
and not the ends of those so used. In particular, this
unsocial power may be of a coercive nature, one that
exploits the fear of others to make them pliable tools.
Kant’s analysis is particularly relevant for the manage-
rial ambition of honor, a particularly addictive ambition
that seeks the good opinion of others. (See Wood 1999,
p. 262, and in the original, Kant 1797, vol. 6, pp. 465–466.)
Kant claimed that this ambition is linked to the psychology
of self-worth associated with the desire to have others
believe you are better than they. This desire for honor often
manifests itself in haughtiness, or wanting others to despise
themselves. An ethical self respect is not related to the
opinion of others; it rests solely on a sense of dignity and
absolute self-worth, and not on a sense of relative superi-
ority. If, however, this sense of dignity is rooted in the
pursuit of a moral community, especially for the business
organization, then these antisocial tendencies of ambition,
superiority and haughtiness should be modified, and sub-
sumed into the ethical pursuit of self-worth associated with
having moral goals rather than seeking superiority. When
we recognize a friend of virtue, we honor the other, and
through reflecting on the other’s moral character, we might
overcome the tendencies of seeking superiority or
haughtiness.
Kant argued that failed ambition particularly leads to
self degradation, and antagonism towards one’s successful
competitors in the struggle for the illusory superiority.
Since ambition is perceived as a goal with an indefinite
time dimension for achievement, one is likely to continu-
ally perceive some degree of failure in that one never (or
seldom) achieves sufficient relative superiority. Pursuit of
a moral community, however, is always perceived as an
ideal continuously sought, but a journey without end.
Success along its path generates self respect rather than any
sense of superiority or inferiority. Whereas ambition is
likely to solicit emotions of envy, and its associated
attempts to frustrate the happiness of others, the pursuit of
the moral community motivates the opposite, i.e., the will
to assist others in pursuing their proper ends. Envy follows
from our tendency to consider ourselves as happy only
when we believe ourselves better off than others.13 This
includes climbing the corporate ladder perhaps by achiev-
ing the demise of others through back-stabbing strategies.
Envy often involves gloating over the misfortunes of oth-
ers, and can lead to cruelty and meanness. Pursuit of the
moral community redirects agents away from these ten-
dencies. (See Wood 1999, p. 264, and Kant 1797, vol. 6,
pp. 458–459.)
Kant also analyzed friendship in the context of morality.
He perceived friendship as the only relationship based
upon our natural needs that requires morality for its sus-
tenance. (See Kant 1797, vol. 6, p. 471.) (Note that Aris-
totle’s and Kant’s views on friendship are notably similar
on this point.) This notion of friendship should be suffi-
ciently broad to incorporate our business relations includ-
ing business associates outside our immediate
establishment. All of these relations are also based on our
natural needs, and demand morality if they are to be sus-
tained. Kant’s three forms of friendship, (1) need, (2) taste,
and (3) disposition (a disposition to recognize our neigh-
bors as friends) all apply to our business relations. To be
sustained, each of these categories
• requires that we participate in the development and
enjoyment of other’s well being through our morally
good will,
• arises from our general need to overcome our unsocial
nature because of our survival need for social interac-
tion, and
• usually involves certain actions of reciprocity since
friendship thrives on (but does not absolutely require)
differences in capacities and personalities so that we
naturally contribute to one another. (See Kant 1797,
vol. 6, pp. 470–474.)
To Kant, moral friendship was not merely an ideal; it
exists, although rarely. Our ‘‘duty to oneself as well as to
others is to not isolate oneself but to use one’s moral
perfection in social intercourse.’’ (1797, vol. 6,
pp. 472–473) This is also an Aristotelian concept presented
in the form of a duty (imperfect duty as explained below).
The ‘‘byproducts’’ of these friendly actions are ‘‘to create a
beautiful illusion resembling virtue that is not deceptive’’
since all understand the nature of these actions.14 Here
Kant suggests that the illusion of the ideal is sufficient to be
practical.
‘‘Affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality, and
gentleness (in disagreeing without quarreling) are,
12 ‘‘Rent seeking’’ in this context means seeking to receive compen-
sation due to position rather than effort.
13 Aristotle (1976, 1168 b 19) also addresses the issue of moral
competition among virtuous people. He indicated the benign benefits
that would result provided the competing parties have an appropriate
sense of moral self-worth.
14 I do not endorse the idea that these by products are only illusion. In
business, these by products are definitely tangible.
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indeed, only tokens; yet they promote the feeling of
virtue itself by a striving to bring this illusion as near
as possible to the truth. By all of these, which are
merely the manners one is obliged to show in social
intercourse, one binds others too; and so they still
promote a virtuous disposition by at least making
virtue fashionable.’’ (Ibid, vol. 4, p. 474)
‘‘By making virtue fashionable’’ we understand the role
of these virtuous characteristics in business where they can
literally be profitable. They are the ideal style of business, a
style that promotes commerce; a style of amicable and
efficient norms both within the firm and for external deal-
ings. This ‘‘fashion’’ is tangible and evolves due to what is
most effective, but is rooted on effective sociability.
These demands of sustenance also surely describe the
comparative advantage relations of the business firm. The
business firm should be viewed as a union of both close and
casual friends, with varying degrees of intimacy, which is
formed for an economic profit-seeking purpose. The re-
ciprocity referred to above consists of a readiness to engage
in reciprocal benevolence in both effort and end goals, with
the pursuit of a moral community being the ultimate
reciprocal goal for each. Friendships of virtue, while
envisioned in Aristotle’s analysis as existing among the
experienced and longer-lasting friends, also stimulates
benevolence both among those experienced friends, but
also benevolence towards others outside immediate
friendships. This plays a role in the pursuit of the moral
community in business.
Clarity among all those engaged as to the maxims
required for a united (or harmonious) pursuit, are the
ultimate concern of Kant’s third formula. In particular, this
pursuit requires clarity as to the juridical and other broad
notions of morality applicable to business, and aimed at
modifying the Kantian notion of unsocial sociability. In
fact, the very notion of forming a business establishment as
a union of friends (close or casual) can be viewed as an
attempt to overcome this unsocial nature. The formation of
our notions of applicable duty is then the purpose of the CI
process (see below), and their implementation relies upon
relations of virtue.
The above analysis partially indicates the purpose of the
pursuit of a moral community and the aims of such a
community within business, i.e., it incorporates friendships
of both advantage and virtue, and presents an environment
where the latter can be developed from the former. It also
aims at developing a community of juridical duty and
benevolence, both of which are fully explored below. In
addition, the business friends embedded in the firm should
achieve a high degree of clarity and commitment to the
ethical structures of the firm—institutionalized procedures
for diligently examining critical business decisions,
evaluation of results with associated responses, and incen-
tive-based rewards—and with this clarity and commitment,
reinforcement of relations of virtue will occur. There is
more about this dynamic development reviewed below.
Some Recent Research in Business Friendship
Although the research reviewed in this section does not
directly concern what is termed relations of virtue, it does
so indirectly, especially concerning how the virtue category
can develop.
Ingram and Zou (2008) document the considerable
volume of research on the tensions generated by business
friendships, that is the tensions resulting from mixing
professional and private lives (nepotism and cronyism that
compromise business efficiency). Most, but not all, of this
research indicates the harm caused by such friendships.
Within the literature that indicates the positive benefits of
business friendships, Baumeister and Leary (1995) and
Fiske (2004) indicate that people seek social belonging
through business friendships, and Tesser (1988) indicates
the benefits of ‘‘basking in reflective glory’’ that results in
the taking on of the attributes of moral business friends, a
notion germane to friendships of virtue. From survey
returns, Helliwell (2005) shows that trust in business
friendships has a positive impact on job satisfaction, and
other measures of physical wellbeing. This body of
research that indicates positive benefits reinforces the
notion that business people desire relations of virtue, and
benefit from their development.
In addition, an array of other positive results is docu-
mented by this research. Friends imbedded in the same
business demonstrate the following:
• Imbedded business friends discuss sensitive issues and
new ideas that would not be shared otherwise. (See Sias
and Cahill 1998, and Gibbons 2004.)
• Imbedded business friends share resources during
crises. (See Krackhardt and Stern 1988.)
• Imbedded business friends make better career-related
decisions. (See Kilduff 1992.)
• Imbedded business friends, and their firms, benefit from
discussions of work problems. (See Fischer 1982.)
With respect to the afore mentioned exchange of specific
business-knowledge, Blau (1964) shows that exchange of
task-related knowledge is facilitated by friendship. Ibarra
and Andrews (1993) shows that the empathy involved in
friendship promotes knowledge transfers within the same
organization. Uzi (1997) shows the advantage of business-
embedded relationships in that friends have better capacity
to understand each other, to communicate effectively, and
are most effective transferring specific knowledge.
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Almeida and Kogut (1999) also documents this specifically
for Silicone Valley business.
All of the research cited above supports the desirability
notion of friendships in business, and the development of
virtuous relations.
The Pursuit of Business as a Moral Community,
Friendships of Virtue, and Duty
Kant (1785, vol. 4, pp. 402–403) posed a process for
deriving the moral maxims necessary for practical living,
i.e., the categorical imperative process (CI process), and
claimed that his categorical imperative merely reflects
common reasoning concerning moral principles, a reason-
ing captured by three specifications (formulae), each con-
sistent with and necessitated by each of the other two.
From his first specification, the formula of autonomy or of
universal law, Kant showed, all our notions of duty, both
perfect and imperfect follow.15 His second formula, the
formula of respect for the dignity of persons, however,
more clearly indicates those duties both to others and to
ourselves.16
The second specification most clearly motivates a set of
maxims we usually classify as duties although the inter-
relatedness of the three formulae implies that all duty can
be derived from each of the three. (See Kant 1785, vol. 4,
pp. 421, 429, 433). O’Neil (1995, pp. 114–115), however,
terms the second formula ‘‘the formula on the ends-in-
itself,’’ and emphasizes its use as the foundation for duty,
both positive and negative (explained below). This vision
of duty is particularly applicable to business which requires
a set of moral rules to function, both negative rules of
prohibition and positive rules for diligent action. In par-
ticular, the second formula is generally interpreted as not
only establishing prohibitions against the unethical actions
of theft, fraud, coercion and the like, but also as requiring
some degree of beneficence (positive duty), but also, as
argued in this section, for diligence in managerial perfor-
mance. Since the specification of this formula concerns
treating both oneself and others as serving their own per-
sonal ends, and not merely serving as a means to another’s
ends, the positive duty side naturally requires practical
limits on beneficence and diligence, limits Kant founded in
‘‘circumstance and inclination.’’ (See Kant 1797, vol. 6,
pp. 452–454.) Below I indicate how friendships of virtue
potentially extend those ‘‘circumstances and inclinations.’’
Without such practical limits, one could impoverish
oneself, or so exhaust oneself in pursuit of beneficence and
diligent performance, that this duty would largely interfere
with obligations to oneself. If broad obligations of benefi-
cence or duty were absolutely applied to business as though
they were all perfect duties, i.e., those without practical
limits, then business could not function in its primary role
of rationing and utilizing resources so as to provide goods
and services to the general public since these resources
would be entirely used for beneficence. This is also true for
positive obligations of diligent performance in that one
must ration personal resources (time and concentrated
effort) towards its most effective use in business without
destroying personal health and wellbeing. Friendships of
advantage and virtue can effectively help with this
rationing. This issue is also explored in more detail below.
The third specification of the CI is the formula of leg-
islation for a moral community: ‘‘All maxims that proceed
from our own making of law ought to harmonize with a
possible kingdom of ends.’’ (Kant 1785, vol. 4, p. 433)
Here legislating means self-legislating, i.e., establishing
self-imposed maxims. Legislating a moral community can
be viewed as the motivational formula for establishing and
pursuing duty since this ‘‘kingdom of ends’’ is generally
interpreted as a ‘‘moral community.’’ (Kant 1785, vol. 4,
p. 433.) As reviewed by Korsgaard (1996, p. 23):
‘‘The human will must be seen as universally leg-
islative. Each of us has a will that makes laws for
itself as if for everyone. Since human beings together
legislate the moral law, we form a moral community:
a Kingdom of Ends. … Each citizen takes his own
perfection and the happiness of others as an end and
treats every other as an end in itself. It is a commu-
nity engaged in the harmonious and cooperative
pursuit of the good.’’17
To seek one’s own perfection and the happiness of
others as an end is likely to lead to Aristotle’s friendships
of virtue.18 This is an essential component of the moral
community in that in order to seek the happiness of others
without developing friendships would require a sort of
callous isolation, which is not Kantian. To seek the hap-
piness of others for the sake of others, and also to pursue
duty for the sake of others, is to be friendly. This pursuit
includes fulfilling juridical duty for sure, but it also
includes more than this.15 ‘‘I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that
my maxim should be a universal law.’’ (Kant 1785, vol. 4, p. 421)
These CI interpretations from the original German are from Sullivan
(1994, p. 29).
16 ‘‘Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only.’’ (Kant
1785, vol. 4, p. 429).
17 Also see Sullivan (1994, pp. 84–87) for a review similar to
Korsgaard’s.
18 See Kant (1797, vol. 6, p. 393).
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For example, in Kantian analysis the pursuit of those
duties that are consistent with the first and second formulae
should be motivated by a desire to pursue a moral com-
munity. This is particularly applicable to business where
laws, regulations, enforceable contracts, and numerous
internal-to-the-firm rules, as well as external ethical and
professional codes, are common. This nexus of maxims
exists to establish business as a myriad of moral agree-
ments ultimately within an overall social/moral economy.
The general purpose of this overall institutional economy is
ultimately the pursuit of the public good. This pursuit can
only be effective if business generally desires to be moral.
The motivation for following these maxims should there-
fore not merely be fear that if caught in violation of law
and/or other rules, the negative consequences will be per-
sonal, but rather that any violation ultimately attacks the
very potential for existence of any business as a moral
community, i.e., the motivation itself must be moral.
As an example, consider the auditing accountant who
because of a conflict of interest considers violating gener-
ally accepted rules. Such violations could lead to signifi-
cant negative consequences for the firm at question, or
even collapse of this firm. If the motivation for respecting
these procedural rules is ‘‘I might lose my license to
practice if I am discovered’’ (an egoistic motive), then
believing that discovery has very small probability, the
accountant has little incentive to not personally benefit at
the expense of the other constituents of the firm. A com-
mitment to pursue the interests of the moral community of
this firm, however, requires a positive interest in the ends
of other firm constituencies, of friends of virtue and of
advantage. This positive empathetic-interest in others
poses recognition of a risk of higher stakes than the fate of
only the isolated individual, stakes that could be destroyed
by moral violation. These are the high stakes at risk from
moral depravation. Which motivation is therefore likely to
be effective: the egoistic consequentialist motive, or the
broader motive of service to society and friendships? I
argue the latter, and hence the importance of the pursuit of
the kingdom of ends as motivation.
Note that this is a consequentialist argument, which is
typically perceived as non-Kantian since Kantian moral
motivation is expressed as ‘‘respect for the moral law’’
without regard to consequences. This is the motivational
point challenged in the ‘‘Moral Motivation’’ section above.
To repeat the elucidation presented there, ‘‘respect’’ pro-
vides an incomplete argument for motivation; the third
formula, however, provides the motive that is non-egoistic
community-consequentialist.19 This is the non-religious
motivation particularly applicable to business.
The ethical community of friends is one directed
towards collective rational ends of which, according to
Kant, there are two kinds: the ends of happiness, and the
ends of morality. Happiness, however, can only be condi-
tionally good as dependent upon morality, i.e., conditional
upon the good will, and the good will pursues the moral
community. A eudaimonist approach cannot aim for hap-
piness unless it entails participation in a moral community,
i.e., it must be subsumed by this moral pursuit. The com-
munal-consequentialist motive can therefore serve the ends
of morality even in Kantian terms.
People in general, and business people in particular,
know that to live a flourishing life, where flourishing is
defined broadly and philosophically, requires participation
in a flourishing community, which in turn can only exist in
a moral community.20 This eudaimonist argument is
developed further below, but some reflection on Kantian
implications needs reference here.
It has been effectively argued above that for establishing
and pursuing our business duties, we must envision our
ideal kingdom of ends as being the ideal moral business
community. This conclusion results from a logical analysis.
This, however, might be perceived as a eudaimonist
argument, one that Kant argues against (1797, vol. 6,
p. 377). He referred to this eudaemonist approach as the
doctrine of happiness, and argued that ‘‘… if eudaimonism
(the principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle
of eleutheronomy (the principle of the freedom of internal
law giving), the result is euthanasia (easy death) of all
morals.’’ (Ibid, vol. 6, p. 378.) Is it possible that this desire
for pursuit of a moral community is not eudaimonist?
We can recognize that this harmonious pursuit by its
community members is a necessary requirement for that
community to flourish to the extent possible, but surely we
recognize that it is not a sufficient condition to assure
happiness for each member, or even that it maximizes the
probability of happiness for our individual self. One can
view duty as possibly a sacrificial obligation necessary for
the community to flourish, and not perceive that our duty
originates in egoistic consequentialist reasons. We cannot
help but know that we might indirectly benefit by our
actions since we live in that community, but that particular
knowledge need not lead to our motivation. In fact, we
commonly observe duty being pursued from apparently
non-egoistic motives, i.e., as members of a community,
people may purse duty from motives of love and respect for
fellow members, and certainly for developing friends of
virtue. As stated more succinctly by Kant,
19 Wood (1999, pp. 301–302) also points out that consequentialist
motivation is either egoistic or communal.
20 Notions of flourishing, as used here, certainly incorporate material
sustenance as well as societal coherence and support. Those economic




‘‘The duty of love for one’s neighbor can, accord-
ingly, also be expressed as the duty to make others’
ends my own (provided only that these are not
immoral). The duty of respect for my neighbor is
contained in the maxim not to degrade any other to a
mere means to my ends (not to demand that another
throw himself away in order to slave for my end).’’
(1797, vol. 6, p. 450.)21
Does making the ends of others our own connote ego-
istic motivation if the process involves developing friend-
ships of virtue? The degree of uncertainty might be large
concerning the possible benefits, but developing friends
constitutes a duty to oneself under the second formula of
the CI. Since each of the three CI formulae imply, or are
necessitated by the others, duty can be derived from each.
Hill, however, establishes the notion that social duty (as
different from duty-to-oneself as asserted by the second CI
formula) is best expressed in the third formula:
‘‘…I have sketched a reconstruction of Kant’s idea of
an inclusive commonwealth (‘‘kingdom’’) united by
common moral laws or principles. The members are
conceived as both lawmakers and subjects. They each
have their own set of ends but in legislating they
abstract from personal differences. They legislate as
rational and autonomous, and so they make only laws
they can justify to each other. As legislators they
respect humanity in each person as an end in itself,
and so they are guided and constrained by all the
values and precepts inherent in this fundamental
ideal. As a formulation of the Categorical Imperative,
the principle tells us always to act in accord with a
possible kingdom of ends. Various supplementary
ideas are needed to bring this abstract model down to
real-world conditions where, for example, local
conditions vary and people are often partisan, weak,
corrupt, and divided. For the most part we should
expect that only very general and defeasible princi-
ples can be justified as universal. These would need
to be applied to various historical circumstances in
light of more specific information. The ideal is to find
well-grounded principles that all reasonable autono-
mous people would endorse; but because disagree-
ments in applying principles are to be expected, as a
practical matter the best we can do is to take ideas
here as guide for conscientious judgement and choice
rather than a sure path to moral truth.’’ (Hill 2012,
p. 81)
The well-grounded principles… endorsed by all reason-
able autonomous people are the foundation of business, and
they certainly include developing relations of virtue for the
reasons reviewed above. These principles declare morality in
business interactions, and without which economic failure is
inevitable. Disagreements are surely common in business, but
the well-grounded principles establish conscientious judge-
ment as a path to moral choice. It is this conscientious judg-
ment that is strengthened by having the second selves. This
occurs because of comparisons with, and learning from one
another, and this should especially occur within the necessary
intense and sustained relations of business.
It must be recognized that understanding, acceptance, and
consistent pursuit of these duties within business requires
sufficient social discourse as should be facilitated by relations
of virtue. (See Kant 1793, vol. 8, pp. 146–147. This is par-
ticularly emphasized by Wood 1999, Chap. 9, Sect. 4.) This
should especially be so among management, between man-
agement and employees, and to a lesser extent between
management and other stakeholders. This open discourse,
particularly among virtuous relations, promotes collective
development of agents’ rational powers, and commitment to
their use. This acceptance requires an understanding of the
duties’ necessity for the sustainability of the organization, an
understanding that can only come from this required com-
munication largely among friendly relations. In fact, this
required communication is itself an ethical duty of managerial
leadership just as friendship is a Kantian duty. We are used to
thinking of business management as autocratic, but the suc-
cess of the firm requires a commitment to duty from those
who participate, and this ideal cannot be expected from a
servile following, but can be expected from a friendly fol-
lowing of committed agents. The ideal requires that all con-
stituents understand and follow the generally accepted duties
that constitute pursuit of the moral community. A lack of
clarity among constituents concerning this pursuit is likely to
lead to egoistic motivation and possible moral failure. These
are points also suggested by Bowie (1999, pp. 88–89).
A fully-moral community clearly requires that all are
committed to both perfect and imperfect duties, even
though the latter has limits due to individual circumstances
and virtuous inclination. (See Korsgaard 1996, p. 20.) It is
more realistic, however, to expect that the latter classifi-
cation of duty should be stronger within certain arrange-
ments where agents are more knowledgeable about the
needs of other participants, perhaps because of closer
connections, perhaps because of developed friendships.
This might occur among friends imbedded in the same firm
rather than in the broader more impersonal relations where
people are distant from each other and perhaps less
knowledgeable about the needs of other participants. We
could assert this principle as a duty from familiarity: The
more familiar (knowledgeable) agents are about the needs
21 This is a Kantian passage that fully expresses the second formula’s
foundation for duty. For duty of virtue based upon respect, further see
Kant (1797, vol. 6, p. 462).
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of each other, and about how to contribute to those needs,
the wider the degree of imperfect duty of beneficence
between them.22
The above proposition is founded on the notion of
effective use of the agent’s resources: time, psychological
commitments, and talents; but it also recognizes the
interpersonal knowledge differences. Any notion of the
circumstances facing an agent with respect to an obligation
of diligent effort should be based on the most effective use
of these resources, and knowledge partly determines the
effectiveness of this resource use.
Positive duties are clearly necessary for promoting the
interests of those both internal and external to the firm. In
Kantian analysis, the self-worth of agents motivates them to
‘‘pursue their own morally permissible welfare and happi-
ness, but also to promote those of others.’’ (Sullivan 1997,
p. 156.) These ‘‘others’’ should certainly include our
friendly business relations especially those of virtue. One
suspects that self-worth, as needed to overcome our unso-
cial sociability, would suffer greatly if the promotion of the
welfare and happiness of our friendly relations were lack-
ing. In the context of business, we note that our relations are
expressions of mutual dependence aimed at fulfilling
mutual needs especially within the firm. We can assert this
principle as a duty from mutual dependence:Mutual respect
requires that both sides of any business interaction are not
only interested in their own ends, but are also interested in
enabling others to achieve their ends, i.e., ‘‘we make our-
selves an end of others’’ and ‘‘through our will we make
others our ends as well. The happiness of others is therefore
an end that is also a duty.’’ (Kant 1797, vol. 6, p. 393.)
The simple question, ‘‘What can I do to help?’’ offered
among business friends of either advantage or virtue,
expresses the principle stated above. This question could even
be used as part of a description of either a friendship of
advantage or of virtue. If we combine the duty from famil-
iarity with the duty from mutual dependence, then we con-
clude that business transactions between agents who are more
knowledgeable about each other’s needs (perhaps because
they are more familiar), should have an expectation of posi-
tive duty with limitations that are wider the greater the degree
of knowledge. This obligation of beneficent assistance should
be stronger the more familiar (or knowledgeable) the agents
are about the obligations and needs of each other, and this
knowledge or familiarity is largely determined by the nature
of the particular business relation in question. Those of
friendship, especially virtuous friendship, must have wider
limits concerning these obligations towards one another.
In Kantian analysis, however,
‘‘… human beings have a duty of friendship.—But it
is readily seen that friendship is only an idea
(although a practically necessary one) and unattain-
able in practice, although striving for friendship (as a
maximum of good disposition toward each other) is a
duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty, but an
honorable one.’’ (Kant 1797, vol. 6, p. 470.)
It appears that Kant is somewhat pessimistic concerning
the moral heights that friendships of virtue might reach.
Those with similar views (certainly darker than Aristotle’s)
appear likely to pose philosophies that rely on juridical
duty for proper behavior among fellow mangers. Those
with more optimistic views of humanity (more in line with
Aristotle’s) appear likely to include both juridical and
broader notions of imperfect duty for managerial behavior.
For business to properly serve society, at minimum
participants must fully conform to juridical requirements.
Businesses based on fraud and deception could not possibly
be viewed as optimally meeting society’s needs since these
organizations would interfere with the worthy ends of
participants, and therefore would implode in that they
would be abandoned. The more participants perceive the
probability of encountering outright fraud or even partial
deception concerning the product, service, or payment, the
more those participants would abandon those institutions in
question. Furthermore, without the commitment to pursue a
moral community, we might not expect agents to fully
conform to these negative duties, although fear of retri-
bution, or ostracism if caught, might motivate a consider-
able degree of conformance depending upon the
probability of discovery. (The auditing accountant example
presented above illustrates this principle.) We must, how-
ever, ask whether purely juridical constraints would be
more likely followed by a community with at least some
virtuous friends as compared to a community lacking such
relations? The answer is obvious. There are two reasons we
answer ‘‘yes’’ to this question. First, relations of virtue
reinforce a developed sense of duty and conscience among
those touched by these friendships. Second, the disap-
pointment over lapses, especially of the juridical sort,
would result in ostracism of the violators from the com-
munity, an unwelcomed ostracism from friends. These
views are expanded in the section below.
Relations of Virtue and Avoidance of Evil
in Business
This section examines the proposition that the avoidance of
evil in business is substantially facilitated by the develop-
ment of relations of virtue within management. As a result,
22 Kant (1797, vol. 6, pp. 451–452) addresses the issue of benevo-
lence as associated with ‘‘closeness,’’ but he does not address the
issue of the connection between ‘‘knowledge’’ and benevolence
except tangentially. (See Sullivan 1997, p. 98.).
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this development should be an integral component of the
pursuit of a moral community.
Kant’s most striking anthropological doctrine is that
human nature contains a radical (extreme) propensity to
evil, an innate propensity to make choices against the
moral law. (See Wood 1999, pp. 283–284.) Kant explains
three types of human evil:
1. The total depravity of willful avoidance of the moral
law,
2. An impurity that requires incentives to initiate one’s
moral duty, and
3. An impurity that requires incentives to fully complete
one’s duty. (See Kant 1793, vol. 6, pp. 29–30.)
According to Kant, evil is a product of our unsocial
sociability, of ambition and envy as reviewed in
the ‘‘Classic and Recent Applicable Notions of Friendship,
Sociability, and Moral Community’’ section above. The
pursuit of a moral community, including virtuous relations,
can be the preventative of evil. As in the quote from Hill
concerning ‘‘well-grounded principles’’ presented above,
pursuit of the K of E can theoretically admit a knowledge
of and commitment to duty that counters our unsocial
tendencies. This can allow both the formation and suste-
nance of business as indicated in the next section, but for
the immediate problem at hand, we should focus on Kant’s
second and third types of evil since perhaps they appear
endemic to business.
A market-system economy is based upon the price
system for allocating resources. This is a monetary incen-
tive system, and there are practical reasons for this.
Monetary compensation expresses general purchasing
power, whereas other business compensation (flexible
schedules, titles, product, position advancement) are not as
generally acceptable, although in some cases they are
acceptable as incentives, but usually more difficult to
negotiate. Even in the human resource market that is
internal to the firm (as well as external human resource
markets), monetary compensation is the norm. The relevant
question is whether compensation is necessary for man-
agers or other employees to seriously pursue their duty,
especially imperfect duties? Monetary compensation,
however, does communicate to employees the importance
the firm places on the performance of duty, i.e., rhetorical
commitment without compensation may be perceived as
not being a serious commitment by the firm.
If widely present in the firm, however, Kant’s second
and third types of evil (those based on incentives for pur-
suing or completing duty) hardly describes a moral com-
munity. It describes, rather, a community of egoistic
consequentialists with all its incentive flaws. Kant’s ethical
community described in Religion Within the Boundaries of
Reason (1793–1994), however, is the completion of the
Kingdom of Ends concept first described in Fundamentals
(1785) and repeated in the Metaphysics (1797). This con-
cept of the moral community goes beyond one in which
negative coercive-type laws are obeyed by all. It involves a
union under norms of virtue that cannot be established by
legislation, but requires virtuous disposition of all. (See
Kant 1793, vol. 6, p. 94 and Allison 2012, p. 222.) It forms
a practical pursuit for humanity even though the actual goal
is unattainable. It cannot even be pursued by the individual
in isolation since, as described above, it requires over-
coming social evils not just individual imperfections. Kant
argued that all must be virtuous in order for each individual
to be fully virtuous. (Kant 1793, vol. 6, pp. 93–102.) It
should be clear, however, that a business community of
developed virtuous relations, with its positive reinforce-
ment and desires for inclusion of all members, is also likely
to provide incentives to avoid evil and pursue the moral
community. Kant terms this ‘‘an impurity’’ due to the
requirements and provisions of incentives. (See Kant’s
second third types of evil listed above.) Can this conflict be
resolved?
Kantian ethics require people ‘‘to unite their ends into a
single, reciprocally supporting teleological system, or realm.
The ideals of Kantian ethics are autonomy, equality, and
community.’’ (Wood 1999, p. 335.) These ideals can only be
pursued as a unit; to fail to pursue one means failure to
pursue the other two. This view concerns the natural conflict
between the individual and a rational striving for an agree-
able community. ‘‘It is about the process of enlightenment
enabling us to form the idea of the laws and principles of
such a community, and about the hope that gradually,
through the historical progress of reason, we may overcome
the conflict that is natural to us and make progress towards
an ideal realm of ends on earth.’’ (Ibid, p. 335.)
‘‘…. The proper model for that collective pursuit is
neither a closed society based on pious adherence to
tradition nor an ever-shifting nexus linking people
solely through self-interest, strategic bargaining, and
exploitation. Real solidarity between mature human
beings can grow only from their shared commitment
to universal principles that are given content and
universal validity by an ongoing process of free,
enlightened communication.’’ (Ibid, p. 336.)
This ‘‘shared commitment’’ is a description of virtuous
relations. Such a shared commitment to universal princi-
ples can certainly be a vision for an ideal business, but in
Kantian analysis, this worldly ideal is perhaps too extreme.
Businesses are combinations of worldly men.
‘‘….Men … mutually corrupt one another’s moral
predispositions. Despite the good will of each indi-
vidual, because they lack a principle which unites
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them, men abandon, through their dissensions, the
common goal of goodness and, just as though they
were instruments of evil, expose one another to the
risk of falling once again under the rule of the evil
principle.’’ (Kant 1793, vol. 6, p. 97.)
Again the question begged is ‘‘Can we find a principle
that can unite us within business?’’
‘‘But because the highest moral good cannot be
achieved merely by the exertions of the single indi-
vidual to unite into a whole directed toward the same
goal, that is into a system of well-disposed men …
the idea of such a whole as a universal republic based
on laws of virtue is an idea sharply distinguished
from all moral laws which concern what we know to
lie in our power. It involves a union of which we do
not know whether, as such, it lies in our power or not.
Hence this duty is distinguished from all others both
in kind and in principle.’’ (Kant 1793, vol. 6,
pp. 98–99.)
The principle sought is the pursuit of virtuous relations
among business associates. A business can, and certainly
should, be a juridical community where all coercive laws
and norms are obeyed. The question is ‘‘Can such a busi-
ness also be a community of virtue?’’ As stated in ‘‘The
Pursuit of Business as a Moral Community, Friendships of
Virtue, and Duty’’ section, this requires that both perfect
(negative) and imperfect (positive) duties be pursued under
the motivation of pursuit of a moral community. This latter
pursuit implies the former pursuit. To be pure, such a
motivation must be untainted from monetary or other
incentives. Still, to more properly answer the above ques-
tion, we best recognize that a business organization is a
nexus of perfect and imperfect duties, the latter including
not only beneficence, but also all of the managerial obli-
gations that have practical limits which themselves are
widened by the development of virtuous relations.
For example, all obligations of due diligence have
practical limits. Due diligence is also a moral obligation of
management owed to all stakeholders. The relevant ques-
tion for managerial agency (agents who represent the
interests of owners) concerns where these limits are drawn.
At what point do we have sufficient data and analysis
concerning a proposed capital project in order to make an
appropriate decision, or perhaps concerning an employee
development proposal, or newly proposed outsourcing
strategy? There are practical limits to expenditures of
managerial time, effort, or financial resources on all man-
agerial efforts whether they involve traditionally defined
beneficence or more broadly defined imperfect responsi-
bilities. As stated above, full managerial pursuit of a moral
community requires these expenditures up to the point of
practical limits, but the setting of those limits are still at
issue, and therefore the extent of the moral obligation. Here
we get to the crux of the matter. Immediate diligent effort
is not the same as a development of expertise, perhaps of
the specific knowledge, but also the general knowledge
required for the effective managerial decision making. This
expertise development is itself a long-run obligation of
diligence. Relations of virtue provides a long-run dynamic
that potentially facilitates this development of expertise.
How? In a virtuous friendly way, senior management
assists those in junior positions through direction, and
senior managers assist and reflect each other’s efforts.
Knowledge makes diligence easier and more effective, and
virtuous relations facilitate development of knowledge,
both firm specific and general.
Relations of Virtue and the Pursuit of a Moral
Community
In an effort separate from his two major publications
concerning morals (1985 and 1797), Kant (1793, vol. 6,
pp. 98–99) argued a religious basis for pursuing a moral
community, that such a community could only be pursued
through a visible church. I argue, however, that business
organizations also aspire to being moral. We can view a
secular organization as pursuing a moral community, and
this is especially practical within business. It is not a visible
church that should be pursued in this context, but a busi-
ness community that fosters virtuous relations. Business
firms potentially qualify as secular visible institutions
ideally constructed to aspire to being moral communities
facilitated by friendships of virtue as developed from
friendships of advantage.
The explicit and implicit contractual structure of a
business, its standard procedures, internal controls,
employee management specifications, external communi-
cation controls, contracts with suppliers, etc., all express its
moral obligations, but beyond these specifications, the
company’s established behaviors with constituencies, par-
ticularly its fairness in negotiations with constituencies,
define the business’ moral content. These behaviors define
the company’s degree of pursuit of a moral community.
These declared procedures and precedents of shared com-
mitments to universal principles established through
ongoing enlightenment communication among virtuous
business associates are all aimed at counteracting our
tendency towards mutual corruption. Such is the potential
of any business organization. This is the meaning of having
a motivation of pursuit of a moral community, but such a
pursuit is centered on internal and external relations of
virtue, i.e., internal and external to the firm.
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